AZNAR vs. CITIBANK, N.A., (Philippines)

                       AZNAR vs. CITIBANK, N.A., (Philippines)

                G.R. No. 164273,  March 28, 2007 

Facts:

      Petitioner Aznar, a known businessman, is a holder of a Preferred Master Credit Card (Mastercard) issued by Citibank. On July 17,1994, Aznar, his wife and grandchildren left for their Asian tour. The plane tickets to Kuala Lumpur for his groups were purchased  using his credit card. During their tour, Aznar used his credit card in some establishments in Malaysia, Singapore and Indonesia, but the said credit card was not honored. And when he tried to use the same in Ingtan Tour and Travel Agency (Ingtan Agency) in Indonesia to purchase plane tickets to Bali, it was again dishonored for the reason that his card was blacklisted by Citibank. Such dishonor forced him to buy the tickets in cash. He further claims that his humiliation caused by the denial of his card was aggravated when Ingtan Agency spoke of swindlers trying to use blacklisted cards.

     On August 26, 1994, Aznar filed a complaint for damages against Citibank, docketed as Civil Case No. CEB-16474 and raffled to RTC Branch 20, Cebu City, claiming that Citibank fraudulently or with gross negligence blacklisted his Mastercard which forced him, his wife and grandchildren to abort important tour destinations and prevented them from buying certain items in their tour.He further claimed that he suffered mental anguish, serious anxiety, wounded feelings, besmirched reputation and social humiliation due to the wrongful blacklisting of his card.To prove that Citibank blacklisted his Mastercard, Aznar presented a computer print-out, denominated as ON-LINE AUTHORIZATIONS FOREIGN ACCOUNT ACTIVITY REPORT, issued to him by Ingtan Agency with the signature of one Victrina Elnado Nubi (Nubi) which shows that his card in question was "DECL OVERLIMIT" or declared over the limit.

     Citibank denied the allegation that it blacklisted Aznar’s card.To prove that they did not blacklist Aznar’s card, Citibank’s Credit Card Department Head, Dennis Flores, presented Warning Cancellation Bulletins which contained the list of its canceled cards covering the period of Aznar’s trip.

     On May 29, 1998, RTC Branch 20, Cebu City, through Judge Ferdinand J. Marcos, rendered its decision dismissing Aznar’s complaint for lack of merit. Aznar filed a motion for reconsideration with motion to re-raffle the case and On Novembe 25, 1998, Aznar’s motion for reconsideration was granted by Judge Jesus S. De la Peña of Branch 10 of Cebu City.Citibank filed an appeal with the CA. On January 30, 2004, the CA rendered its Decision granting Citibank’s appeal.The assailed order of the Regional Trial Court, 7th Judicial Region, Branch 10, Cebu City, in Civil Case No. CEB-16474 was set aside and the decision, dated 29 May 1998 of the Regional Trial Court, 7th Judicial Region, Branch 20, Cebu City was reinstated.

      Hence, the appeal.

Issue:

      Whether or not the On Line Authorization Report is an electronic document and constitutes electronic evidence.

Held:

     The dishonor of Aznar’s Mastercard is not sufficient to support a conclusion that said credit card was blacklisted by Citibank, especially in view of Aznar’s own admission that in other merchant establishments in Kuala Lumpur and Singapore, his Mastercard was accepted and honored.

   Aznar puts much weight on the ON-LINE AUTHORIZATION FOREIGN ACCOUNT ACTIVITY REPORT, a computer print-out handed to Aznar by Ingtan Agency, marked as Exh. "G", to prove that his Mastercard was dishonored for being blacklisted. On said print-out appears the words "DECL OVERLIMIT" .

  As correctly pointed out by the RTC and the CA, however, such exhibit cannot be considered admissible as its authenticity and due execution were not sufficiently established by petitioner.

  While the Court commiserates with Aznar for whatever undue embarrassment he suffered when his credit card was dishonored by Ingtan Agency, especially when the agency’s personnel insinuated that he could be a swindler trying to use blacklisted cards, the supreme court cannot grant his present petition as he failed to show by preponderance of evidence that Citibank breached any obligation that would make it answerable for said suffering.

WHEREFORE, the petition is denied for lack of merit.

  

    

 

                                      NUEZ vs. CRUZ-APAO

               (A.M. No. CA-05-18-P, April 12, 2005)

Facts:

   Complainant Nuez's case had been pending with the CA for more than two years. He filed an illegal dismissal case against PAGCOR before the Civil Service Commission (CSC).  The CSC ordered complainant’s reinstatement but a writ of preliminary injunction and a temporary restraining order was issued by the CA in favor of PAGCOR, thus complainant was not reinstated to his former job pending adjudication of the case. In line with this,  Nuez was in desperate need of help that can speed up his case before the CA.  He contacted, Elvira Cruz-Apao, an Executive Assistant II of the acting Division Clerk of Court of CA, whom he learned from his sister-in-law.  Elvira texted Zaldy, that a favorable decision can be made provided P1Million be given to her.  Zaldy bargained for a lower amount but Elvira refused, mentioning that it is the flat rate the person who will make the favorable decision.  Elvira texted Zaldy that they have to meet at times Plaza Un Avenue.  Zaldy and Elvira met and negotiated for a lower price, but to no avail.  They arranged for another meeing, but now, Zaldy coordinated to matter with GMA 7 Imbestigador, where assistance from PAOCTF was sought for an entrapment operation.  During the meeting, marked money was prepared.  Agents of PAOCTF were in position to execute the entrapement.  When Elvira arrived, she was anxious that an entrapment will be made.  Eventually the PAOCTF operators executed the entrapment and investigated the respondent. 

     The respondent maintained that what happened was a case of instigation and not an entrapment. She asserted that the offer of money in exchange for a favorable decision came not from her but from complainant. To support her contention, she presented witnesses who testified that it was complainant who allegedly offered money to anyone who could help him with his pending case. She likewise claimed that she never touched the money on 28 September 2004, rather it was Capt. Maclang who forcibly held her hands and pressed it to the envelope containing the money. She thus asked that the administrative case against her be dismissed.

Issue:

 Whether or not text messages can be used as evidence before the court.

Held:

   The Supreme Court held that, complainant was able to prove by his testimony in conjunction with the text messages from respondent duly presented before the Committee that the latter asked for One Million Pesos (P1,000,000.00) in exchange for a favorable decision of the former’s pending case with the CA. The text messages were properly admitted by the Committee since the same are now covered by Section 1(k), Rule 2 of the Rules on Electronic Evidence which provides:

"Ephemeral electronic communication" refers to telephone conversations, text messages . . . and other electronic forms of communication the evidence of which is not recorded or retained."

  

    Under Section 2, Rule 11 of the Rules on Electronic Evidence, "Ephemeral electronic communications shall be proven by the testimony of a person who was a party to the same or who has personal knowledge thereof . . . ." In this case, complainant who was the recipient of said messages and therefore had personal knowledge thereof testified on their contents and import.  Respondent herself admitted that the cellphone number reflected in complainant’s cellphone from which the messages originated was hers. Moreover, any doubt respondent may have had as to the admissibility of the text messages had been laid to rest when she and her counsel signed and attested to the veracity of the text messages between her and complainant. It is also well to remember that in administrative cases, technical rules of procedure and evidence are not strictly applied. We have no doubt as to the probative value of the text messages as evidence in determining the guilt or lack thereof of respondent in this case.

     Hence, the high court  found Elvira Cruz-Apao guilty of Grave Misconduct and violation of SECTIONS 1 and 2 of the CODE OF CONDUCT FOR COURT PERSONNEL and is accordingly DISMISSED from government service, with prejudice to re-employment in any branch, instrumentality or agency of the government, including government-owned and controlled corporations. 

                   

          Garcillano vs House of Representatives

       GR 170338, December 23, 2008

Facts:

    These are two (2) consolidated cases regarding the tapes ostensibly containing a wire tapped conversation purportedly between the President of the Philippines and a high-ranking official of the Commission on Elections (COMELEC). The tapes, notoriously referred to as the “Hello Garci” tapes, allegedly contained the President’s instructions to COMELEC Commissioner Virgilio Garcillano to manipulate in her favor results of the 2004 presidential elections. These recordings were to become the subject of heated legislative hearings conducted separately by committees of both House of Congress.

    Petitioner in GR 170338,Virgilio Garcillano, filed a petition to restrain the House Committees from using the tape recordings of the “illegally obtained” wiretap led conversations in their committee reports and for any purpose and be ordered that the said recordings be stricken off the records of the inquiry, and that respondent house committees desist from further using the recordings in any of the House proceedings.

    Petitioners in GR 179275, both retired justices in the CA, filed a petition seeking to bar the Senate from conducting its scheduled legislative inquiry, arguing that the inquiry violates RA 4200 and the Constitutional mandate regarding the publication of its rules of procedure in the conduct of inquiries in aid of legislation.

   Respondents in this particular case justified their non-observance of the constitutional mandate by arguing that the rules have never been amended since 1995 and despite that, they are published in booklet form available to anyone for free and accessible to the public at the Senate’s Internet web page.

Issue:

     Whether or not publication, in the Internet and in pamphlet form, of the Senate Rules of Procedure is deemed valid as publication mandated by the Constitution.

Held:

     Absence of any amendment to the rules cannot justify the Senate’s defiance of the clear and unambiguous language of Section 21, Article VI of the Constitution. The organic law instructs, without more, that the Senate or it’s committees may conduct inquiries in aid of legislation only in accordance with duly published rules of procedure, and does not make any distinction whether or not these rules have undergone amendments or revisions. The constitutional mandate to publish the said rules prevails over any custom, practice, or tradition followed by the Senate.

    The invocation by the respondents of the provisions of RA 8792 or the E-Commerce Act of 2000, to support their claim of valid publication through the Internet is all the more incorrect. RA 8792 considers an electronic data message or an electronic document only for evidentiary purposes. The law merely recognizes the admissibility in evidence (for being original) of electronic data messages and/or electronic documents. It does not make the Internet a medium for publishing laws, rules and regulations.

     Given this discussion, the respondent Senate Committees, therefore, could not, in violation of the Constitution, use its unpublished rules in the legislative inquiry subject of these consolidated cases. The conduct of inquiries in aid of legislation by the Senate has to be deferred until it shall have caused the publication of the rules, because it can do so only “in accordance with its duly published rules of procedure.”

      Petition in GR 170338 is dismissed and petition in GR 179275 is granted.

                           LIHAYLIHAY vs.  CANDA

         A.M. No. MTJ-09-1730, June 18, 2009

Facts:
   On 5 January 2006,  Respondent Judge Canda sent a text message to Lihaylihay stating, “Maayo tingali modistansya ka anang mga tawhana kay basin masabit ka, pakiusap lang ni.” Taking the text message as a threat, Lihaylihay reported it to the police and requested that a blotter entry be made. 

     On 6 January 2006, Judge Canda sent another text message stating, “For maliciously causing it to appear as threatening in the police blotter of what is otherwise a very harmless text message of appeal I consider the same as declaration of war, don’t worry you will have your owned fair share of trouble in due time.” 

     On  20 January 2006, petitione Lihaylihay filed a complaint   with the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) charging Judge Canda of (1) bullying her; (2) ridiculing, humiliating, and besmirching her reputation by publishing in the newspaper the 11 January 2006 letter describing her as a GRO and a whore; (3) sending her threatening text messages; and (4) sending her indecent text messages. The case was docketed as MTJ-06-1659.
      On 25 January 2006,  Judge Canda filed a complaint with the OCA charging Lihaylihay with conduct unbecoming a court employee for publishing in the newspaper her 20 January 2006 comment. The case was docketed as A.M. No. P-06-2254.

     The OCA found that Lihaylihay and Judge Canda failed to preserve the good image of the judiciary. The OCA stated that:
    This Office is disappointed, nay, ashamed of the actuations of the complainant and respondent in this case. Their disgraceful behavior adversely affects the good image of the judiciary. Their actuations degraded the image of the courts before the eyes of the public.  
       In the instant case, respondent, although not directly responsible for the publication of her comment should have exercised prudence in dealing with the media considering the interest generated by the publication of the complaint against her by Judge Canda. She should have known that the media would take advantage of the opportunity to sensationalize the case considering the personalities involved.

  Issue: 
    Whether or not Judge Canda is liable for gross misconduct by humiliating and sending indecent messages to Lihaylihay. 

  Held:

   Judge Canda’s acts of (1) threatening Lihaylihay with her “fair share of trouble in due time”; (2) filing administrative complaints and a criminal case to harass her; (3) describing her as a “GRO,” “undignified,” a “whore,” “disgusting,” “repulsive,” “pakialamera,” “offensive,” “demeaning,” and “inappropriate”; and (4) publishing such foul remarks in the newspaper are very unbecoming a judge. The image of the judiciary is reflected in the conduct of its officials and Judge Canda subjected the judiciary to embarrassment.


     WHEREFORE, the Court finds Judge Alejandro T. Canda, Municipal Circuit Trial Court, Liloy-Tampilisan, Judicial Region IX, Zamboanga del Norte, GUILTY of GROSS MISCONDUCT CONSTITUTING VIOLATIONS OF THE CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT.

 

                                      ESCALONA vs. PADILLO

                  (A.M. No. P-10-2785, September 21, 2010) 

Facts:

    On 22 January 2007, Complainant Escalona filed   a complaint charging respondent  Padillo, Court Stenographer III of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Branch 260, Parañaque City with Grave Misconduct. Escalona claimed that she approached Jun Limcaco (Limcaco), the president of their homeowners’ association, regarding her problem with Loresette Dalit (Dalit). Limcaco referred her to Padillo to help facilitate the filing of a case against Dalit. Padillo allegedly promised to prepare the necessary documents and asked for P20,000 purportedly as payment for the prosecutor. Escalona requested that the amount be reduced to P15,000. Padillo received the P15,000 at the Little Quiapo Branch Better Living Subdivision. Thereafter, Escalona received a text message from Padillo informing her that the prosecutor was not amenable to the reduced amount of P15,000. After two weeks, Escalona gave the balance of P5,000 to Padillo allegedly for the service of the warrant of arrest. Escalona was also asked to submit a barangay clearance and to first take an oath before Prosecutor Antonio Arquiza, Jr. and later before Prosecutor Napoleon Ramolete. However, subsequent verification from the Prosecutor’s Office showed no record of a case filed against Dalit. Escalona confronted Padillo who promised to return to her the money. Padillo reneged on her promise.

Hence, this complaint.


Issue:

Whether or not Padillo is guilty of Grave Misconduct?

Held:

      We agree with the Court Administrator that this Court could no longer impose the penalty of dismissal from the service because Padillo resigned a month after the filing of the administrative complaint. However, her resignation did not render the complaint against her moot. Resignation is not and should not be a convenient way or strategy to evade administrative liability when a court employee is facing administrative sanction.

    Section 2, Canon 1 of the Code of Conduct of Court Personnel provides that "(C)ourt personnel shall not solicit or accept any gift, favor or benefit based on any explicit or implicit understanding that such gift, favor or benefit shall influence their official actions." Section 52 (A)(11) of Rule IV of the Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service also provides that dismissal is the penalty for improper solicitation even if it is the first offense. Section 58(a) of the same Rule provides that the penalty of dismissal shall carry with it the cancellation of eligibility, forfeiture of retirement benefits, and perpetual disqualification from reemployment in the government service.

WHEREFORE, respondent Consolacion S. Padillo is found GUILTY of GRAVE MISCONDUCT.

             
                                             TORRES vs. PAGCOR

                 

                        GR 193531, December 14, 2011

   

Facts: 

    Petitioner was a Slot Machine Operations Supervisor of respondent PAGCOR. On the basis of an alleged Operations Supervisor of respondent PAGCOR. On the basis of an alleged intelligence report of padding of the CMR of the slot machines at PAGCOR – Hyatt Manila, respondent PAGCOR’s CIU discovered the scheme of CMR padding which was committed by adding zero after the 1st digit of the actual CMR of a slot machine or adding a digit before the 1st digit of the actual CMR. CIU identified petitioner as one of the members responsible for such CMR padding. Petitioner was dismissed from the service.

Petitioner filed with the CSC a complaint for illegal dismissal and nonpayment of back wages and other benefits against PAGCOR; alleging among others that he tried to persuade respondent PAGCOR to review and reverse its decision in a letter of reconsideration addressed to the Chairman, the members of the Board and the Merit Systems Protection Board.

   CSC denied the appeal; it did not give credit to petitioner’s claim that he sent a facsimile transmission of his letter reconsideration within the period prescribed. It found out that one of the telephone numbers where petitioner allegedly sent his letter reconsideration did not belong to PAGCOR’s office of the Board of Directors; and that petitioner should have mentioned about the alleged facsimile transmission at the first instance where he filed his complaint.

On appeal, CA dismissed the petition for it found insufficient to merit consideration petitioner’s claim that he had sent through a facsimile transmission a letter reconsideration addressed to PAGCOR chair, members of the Board and the Merit Systems Protection Board, and assuming that a letter was indeed sent, such facsimile transmission is inadmissible as electronic evidence under the E-Commerce Act of 2000; and that the telephone number where petitioner claimed stop be the recipient of the faxed document sent was not that of the PAGCOR’s office of the Board of Directors.

Issue: 

   Whether or not the CSC erred in ruling that there was no valid letter reconsideration submitted.

Held:

    The mode used by the petitioner in filing his reconsideration is not sanctioned by the Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service. As stated earlier, the motion for reconsideration may be filed only in two ways, either by mail or personal delivery.

” A facsimile is not a genuine and authentic pleading. It is, at best, an exact copy preserving all the marks of an original. Without the original, there is no way of determining on its face whether the facsimile pleading is genuine and authentic and was originally signed by them party and his counsel. It may, in fact, be a sham pleading.xxx” (Garvida vs Sales, Jr.)

“We, therefore, conclude that the terms “electronic data message” and “electronic document” as defined under the Electronic Commerce Act of 2000, do not include a facsimile transmission. Accordingly, a facsimile transmission cannot be considered as electronic evidence. It is not the functional equivalent of an original under the Best Evidence Rule and is not admissible as electronic evidence.” (MCC Industries Sales Corporation vs Ssangyong Corporation).

Petition denied.

          

        
                      ANG vs. COURT OF APPEALS           
                      G.R. No. 182835, April 20, 2010

Facts: 
     Complainant Irish Sagud and accused Rustan Ang were sweethearts. However, Irish broke up with him when she learned he had taken a live-in partner whom he had gotten pregnant. Rustan convinced her to elope with him for he did not love the woman whom he was about to marry, but Irish rejected the proposal. She changed her cellphone number but Rustan managed to get hold of it and send her text messages.

    Irish received through multimedia message a picture of a naked woman with spread legs and with her face superimposed on the figure. The sender’s cellphone number, stated in the message, was one of the numbers used by Rustan. After she got the obscene picture, she received text messages from Rustan threatening her that he will spread the picture he sent through the Internet.

   Under police supervision, Irish contacted Rustan through the cellphone number he used in sending the picture and text message. She asked him to meet her at a resort and he did. Upon parking his motorcycle and walking towards Irish, the police intercepted and arrested him. The police seized his cellphone and several SIM cards.

Issue:
    Whether or not the RTC properly admitted in evidence the obscene picture presented in the case.


Held:

   Rustan claims that the obscene picture sent to Irish through a text message constitutes an electronic document. Thus, it should be authenticated by means of an electronic signature, as provided under Section 1, Rule 5 of the Rules of Electronic Evidence.

   The objection is too late since he should have objected to the admission of the pictures on such ground at the time it was offered in evidence. He should be deemed to have waived such ground for objection.

   Besides, the rules he cites do not apply to the present criminal action. The Rules on Electronic Evidence applies only to civil actions, quasi-judicial proceedings, and administrative proceedings.

Petition denied.

                                        

                            NAPOCOR vs. CODILLA
                          G.R. No. 170491, April 4, 2007


Facts:

     M/V Dibena Win, a vessel of foreign registry owned and operated by private respondent Bangpai Shipping Co., allegedly bumped and damaged petitioner’s Power Barge 209 which was then moored at Cebu International Port. Thus, petitioner filed before the Cebu RTC a complaint for damages against private respondent Bangpai Shipping Co., for alleged damages caused on the petitioner’s power barges. Subsequently, petitioner impleaded herein private respondent Wallem Shipping Inc. as additional defendant. 

    After adducing evidence during the trial of the case, petitioner filed a formal offer of evidence before the lower court. Private respondents filed their respective objections to petitioner’s formal offer of evidence.

   Public respondent judge issued the assailed order denying the admission and excluding from the records some of petitioner’s exhibits and submarkings on the ground that the documents formally offered as evidence were photocopies, not the originals. Respondent Wallem Shipping invoked that Xerox copies do not constitute the electronic evidence defined in Section 1 of Rule 2 of the Rules of Electronic Evidence. Further, respondent judge ruled that the information in those Xerox or photocopies was not received, recorded, retrieved or produced electronically, and that electronic evidence must be authenticated, which the petitioner failed to do. Finally, the required Affidavit to prove admissibility and evidentiary weight of the alleged electronic evidence was not executed, much less presented in evidence. On petition for certiorari, CA ruled in favor of respondent judge.


Issue: 

   Whether or not petitioner is correct in its contention that the photocopies he offered as formal evidence before the trial court are the functional equivalent of their original based on its inimitable interpretation of the Rules of Electronic Evidence.

Held: 

   An “electronic document” refers to information or the representation of information, data, figures, symbols or other models of written expression, described or however represented, by which a right is established or an obligation extinguished, or by which a fact may be proved or affirmed, which is received, recorded, transmitted, stored, processed, retrieved or produced eletronically. It includes digitally signed documents and any printout, readable by sight or other means which accurately reflects the electronic data message or electronic document. The rules use the word “information” to define an electronic document received, recorded, transmitted, stored, processed, retrieved or produced electronically. This would suggest that an electronic document is relevant only in terms of the information contained therein, similar to any other document which is presented in evidence as proof of its contents. However, what differentiates an electronic document from a paper-based document is the manner by which information is processed; clearly the information contained in an electronic document is received, recorded, transmitted, stored, processed, retrieved or produced electronically.

   A perusal of the information contained in the photocopies submitted by petitioner will reveal that not all of the contents therein, such as signatures of the persons who purportedly signed the documents, may be recorded or produced electronically. Hence, the argument of the petitioner that since these paper printouts were produced through electronic process, then these photocopies are electronic document as defined in the Rules on Electronic Evidence is obviously an erroneous, if not preposterous, interpretation of the law. Having thus declared that the offered photocopies are not tantamount to electronic documents, it is consequential that the same may not be considered as the functional equivalent of their original as decreed in the law.

            

          MCC INDUSTRIAL SALES CORPORATION vs.SSANGYONG CORPORATION
                     G.R. No. 170633, October 17, 2007


Facts:

     On April 13, 2000, Ssangyong Manila Office sent, by fax, a letter, to confrm MCC Industrial Sales and Sanyo Seiki's order of 220 metric tons (MT) of hot rolled stainless steel addressed to MCC's manager and President of Sanyo Seiki Stainless Steel Corporation Gregory Chan. On behalf of the corporations, Chan, assented and affixed his signature on the conforme portion of the letter.

     On April 17, 2000, Ssangyong forwarded to MCC Pro Forma Invoice No. ST2-POSTSO401 containing the terms and conditions of the transaction. MCC sent back by fax to Ssangyong the invoice bearing the conformity signature of Chan. As stated in the pro forma invoice, payment for the ordered steel products would be made through an irrevocable letter of credit (L/C) at sight in favor of Ssangyong. Following their usual practice, delivery of the goods was to be made after the L/C had been opened. On the same date, due to the fact that MCC could only open a partial letter of credit, the order for 220MT of steel was split into two, one for 110MT and another for 110MT covered by Pro Forma Invoice Nos. ST2-POSTS0401-1 and ST2-POSTS0401-2 respectively.

    On June 20, 2000, Ssangyong, through its Manila Office, informed Sanyo Seiki and Chan, by way of a fax transmittal, that stainless steel from Korea was ready to ship to the Philippines. It requested that the opening of the L/C be facilitated. Chan affixed his signature on the fax transmittal and returned the same, by fax, to Ssangyong. The first L/C covering payment for 100MT of stainless steel coil under Pro Forma Invoice No. ST2-POSTS080-2 was opened. The goods covered by the said invoice were then shipped to and received by MCC. But, for the second L/C, MCC refused to open it that resulted to the filing of civil action by SSangyong for damages due to breach of contract.

   After Ssangyong rested its case, MCC filed a Demurrer to Evidence, alleging that respondent failed to present the original copies of the pro forma invoices on which the civil action was based. The court denied the demurrer, ruling that the documentary evidence is admissible pursuant to RA 8792 and that both testimonial and documentary evidence tended to substantiate the material allegations in the complaint, suffice for the purposes of prima facie case. On appeal to the CA, the appellate court affirmed the ruling of the trial court and ruled that the Pro Forma invoices were admissible in evidence , although they were mere facsimile printouts of the steel orders.

Issue: 

    Whether or not the print out and/or photocopies of facsimile transmissions are electronic evidence and admissible as such.


Held:

   In an ordinary facsimile transmission, there exists an original paper-based information or data that is scanned, sent through a phone line, and re-printed at the receiving end. Further, in a virtual or paperless environment, technically, there is no original copy to speak of, as all direct printouts of the virtual reality are the same, in all respects, and are considered as originals. Ineluctably, the law's definition of "electronic data message," which, as aforesaid, is interchangeable with "electronic document," could not have included facsimile transmissions, which have an original paper-based copy as sent and a paper-based facsimile copy as received. These two copies are distinct from each other, and have different legal effects.


The terms "electronic data message" and "electronic document," as defined under the Electronic Commerce Act of 2000, do not include a facsimile transmission. Accordingly, a facsimile transmission cannot be considered as electronic evidence. It is not the functional equivalent of an original under the Best Evidence Rule and is not admissible as electronic evidence.


Since a facsimile transmission is not an "electronic data message" or an "electronic document," and cannot be considered as electronic evidence by the Court, with greater reason is a photocopy of such a fax transmission not electronic evidence. Hence, the Supreme court held that Pro Forma Invoices are mere photocopies of the original fax transmittals and not electronic evidence, contrary to the position of both the trial and the appellate courts.


In this case, the appeal is PARTIALLY GRANTED.